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forward, since the presence of a liquidity policy leads to externalities. We argue that
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1 Introduction
If a financial enterprise (bank, insurance company, investment fund, etc.) consists of several
divisions (individuals, products, subportfolios, risk factors, etc.), not only is it important
to measure the risk of the entire financial enterprise properly, but also to allocate this risk
to the divisions using a proper risk allocation method.
Risk allocation has many applications: the division of capital reserves among business
units by financial institutions; strategic decision making regarding new business lines; prod-
uct pricing; performance measurement; the formation of risk limits; see Denault (2001),
Kalkbrener (2005), Buch and Dorfleitner (2008), Homburg and Scherpereel (2008), Kim
and Hardy (2009), Cso´ka, Herings, and Ko´czy (2009), and Menchero and Davis (2011).
The various applications have the following question in common: how to allocate the
risk of the financial enterprise over its constituents? A natural approach to answer this
question comes from cooperative game theory. First, one defines a risk allocation game, the
cooperative game where a player is a portfolio and the payoffs of a coalition are negatively
related to the risk of the coalition’s portfolio.
Next, the risk of a portfolio is measured by an appropriate method. In particular,
we advocate to use coherent measures of risk (Artzner, Delbaen, Eber, and Heath, 1999),
which are defined by four axioms: monotonicity, subadditivity, positive homogeneity, and
translation invariance. Cso´ka, Herings, and Ko´czy (2007) show that these axioms are
supported by a natural general equilibrium approach to measure risk. Of these axioms,
subadditivity is the most essential one, and captures the notion that the risk of the financial
enterprise is at most as large as the sum of the risks of its divisions.
Finally, one can use one of the point-valued solution concepts in cooperative game the-
ory like the Shapley value (Shapley, 1953) or the nucleolus (Schmeidler, 1969) to attribute
risk to the players, or one of the set-valued solution concepts like the core (Gillies, 1959)
to determine stable allocations of risk.
Liquidity is a major concern in financial markets. This is most certainly the case
in times of liquidity crises (Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2008) list the Black Monday in
1987, the U.S.-Iraq war in 1990, the fall of LTCM in 1998, and the subprime crisis in
2007), but also in normal times the liquidity of an asset is of tremendous importance.
In recognition of this fact, MSCI has recently introduced LiquidityMetrics, whereby the
liquidity is estimated for a large range of assets (Acerbi and Szekeres, 2013).
Acerbi and Scandolo (2008) extend the axioms of coherent risk measures to incorporate
two types of liquidity considerations. First, requirements on the composition of the port-
folio, captured by the so-called liquidity policy and, second, the liquidity of asset markets
as expressed by marginal demand curves, corresponding to the order books of the assets
at a given future point in time.
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In this paper, we incorporate liquidity considerations in risk allocation. Doing so is not
straightforward, since the imposition of a liquidity policy generates strong externalities
among the divisions of a financial enterprise. Indeed, any division of the enterprise can
liquidate some of its assets in order to satisfy the liquidity policy, and the more assets one
division liquidates, the less assets have to be liquidated by other divisions. The standard
approaches to define a game in characteristic function form in the presence of externalities
are α–effectiveness and β–effectiveness as suggested by Aumann (1961), thereby generaliz-
ing the two–player case treated by von Neumann and Morgenstern (1944) to the case with
an arbitrary number of players.
The notion of α–effectiveness defines the payoff of a coalition as the payoff it can achieve
irrespective of the actions taken by its complement. In a sense, the coalition acts first in
anticipation of the worst actions its complement can take. The notion of β–effectiveness
is less stringent and defines the payoff of a coalition as what it can achieve for sure given
the worst actions of its complement, so now the complementary coalition acts first. We
will argue that as soon as the liquidity considerations are non–trivial, the two standard
approaches should not be applied. We also argue that the approach where the portfolio of
the coalition’s complement is ignored, or equivalently, put equal to zero, is not satisfactory.
Rather than taking a worst–case approach for the behavior of the complementary coali-
tion, we will fix the portfolio holdings of the players outside the coalition to their initial
values, thereby placing the burden of satisfying the liquidity policy entirely on the coali-
tion itself, but not putting an extra burden because of adversary behavior of the coalition’s
complement. The resulting cooperative games with transferable utility are called risk al-
location games with liquidity constraints where, as we demonstrate in an example, adding
liquidity considerations can lead to a strikingly different risk allocation.
Our main theorem claims that the class of risk allocation games with liquidity con-
straints is totally balanced, thereby generalizing the result for risk allocation games with-
out liquidity constraints in Cso´ka, Herings, and Ko´czy (2009). A direct consequence of
this result is that risk allocation games with liquidity constraints have a non-empty core.
Thus it follows that even when taking liquidity considerations into account, there is always
a stable way to allocate risk.
It has been shown in Cso´ka, Herings, and Ko´czy (2009) that any totally balanced
game is generated by some risk allocation game without liquidity constraints. Since a risk
allocation game without liquidity considerations results as a special case when the liquidity
policy is trivial and assets are perfectly liquid, it holds that any totally balanced game is
generated by some risk allocation game with liquidity constraints. We therefore obtain an
equivalence between the class of risk allocation games with liquidity constraints and the
class of totally balanced games.
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The structure of the paper is as follows. In Section 2 we set up risk environments with
liquidity considerations and in Section 3 we define risk allocation games with liquidity
constraints. Section 4 contains our main theorem and Section 5 concludes.
2 Risk Environments with Liquidity Considerations
Acerbi and Scandolo (2008) study coherent measures of risk in a framework where portfo-
lios are subject to liquidity considerations. Cso´ka, Herings, and Ko´czy (2009) study risk
allocation games that are generated by coherent measures of risk in a set-up where liq-
uidity considerations are absent. In this section we extend the analysis of Cso´ka, Herings,
and Ko´czy (2009) and we define risk environments that take liquidity considerations into
account. We denote such risk environments by (N, J, S, pi, θ,m, L, ρ).
The group of players in a risk environment is denoted by N, it consists of the n divisions
of a financial enterprise, and it is referred to as the firm. Each division holds cash as well
as assets belonging to a set J. The initial portfolio θi = (θi0, θ
i
J) ∈ R×RJ of division i ∈ N
shows the amounts of cash and assets held initially by division i. The initial porfolio of the
firm is given by the aggregate portfolio θ(N) =
∑
i∈N θ
i. We denote the space of portfolios
by P = R × RJ . Cash has a number of special properties which we explain in the sequel.
The addition of an amount of cash a ∈ R to a portfolio p ∈ P is denoted by p ⊕ a and
results in the portfolio q ∈ P defined by q0 = p0 + a and qj = pj, j ∈ J. The tuple of the
initial portfolios of the various divisions is denoted by θ = (θi)i∈N .
The future value of the initial portfolio is subject to uncertainty. One out of a set S of
possible states of nature materializes in the future, where state of nature s ∈ S occurs with
probability pis > 0. Clearly, it holds that
∑
s∈S pis = 1. The value of the initial portfolio
in state s depends on the order books for the various assets and the liquidity policy of
the firm, both of which are allowed to be state dependent. We follow C¸etin, Jarrow and
Protter (2004) and Jarrow and Protter (2005) in modeling the order book for asset j in
state s by a marginal demand curve msj . A function is ca`dla`g if it is right continuous with
left limits and la`dca`g if it is left continuous with right limits.
Definition 2.1. The marginal demand curve (MDC) for asset j ∈ J in state s ∈ S is
given by the map msj : R \ {0} 7→ R satisfying
(i) msj(x) ≥ msj(x′) if x < x′;
(ii) msj is ca`dla`g at x < 0 and la`dca`g at x > 0.
The amount msj(x) for x > 0 expresses the marginal bids that have been made to buy
an amount x of asset j. Similarly, msj(x) for x < 0 represents the marginal asks that have
been made for an amount x of asset j to be sold. We call msj(0
+) the best bid and msj(0
−)
the best ask price of asset j.
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The part of the MDC corresponding to negative (positive) values of x corresponds to
the demand (supply) of the asset by others. MDCs can therefore be used to represent
both demand and supply side constraints in liquidity. Note that the MDC is not defined
at zero, and continuity with left/right limits allows for jumps to arbitrarily low numbers
for positive values of x and to arbitrarily high numbers for negative values of x.
So far the issue of liquidity has not been considered at all in risk allocation games.
Implicitly, it has been assumed that the MDCs are all flat, corresponding to perfectly
liquid asset markets.
Definition 2.2. Asset j ∈ J is perfectly liquid if for every s ∈ S, there is c ∈ R such that
for all x ∈ R \ {0}, msj(x) = c.
Since the constant c is allowed to depend on s, the price against which an asset can be
bought or sold is allowed to be stochastic, even when the asset market is perfectly liquid.
The MDC can be used to calculate the liquidation value of a portfolio.
Definition 2.3. The liquidation mark-to-market value of a portfolio p ∈ P in state s ∈ S
is defined by
`s(p) = p0 +
∑
j∈J
∫ pj
0
msj(x)dx. (1)
The liquidation mark-to-market value of a portfolio equals the portfolio’s amount of
cash plus the proceeds of selling all long positions minus the payments needed to close
short positions. Acerbi and Scandolo (2008) prove the following result.
Proposition 2.4. For every s ∈ S, the function `s : P 7→ R is continuous and concave.
The set of portfolios attainable from some given portfolio p ∈ P in state s ∈ S is given
by
As(p) = {q ∈ P | q0 = `s(p0, pJ − qJ)}.
The portfolio q ∈ As(p) is obtained by liquidating the amounts pJ − qJ of assets in J and
adding the proceeds to p0.
Proposition 2.5. For every s ∈ S, for every p ∈ P, the set As(p) is closed.
Proof. Let (qr)r∈N be a sequence in As(p) with limit q¯ ∈ P. We have to show that
q¯ ∈ As(p). For every r ∈ N, it holds that qr0 = `s(p0, pJ − qrJ). By Proposition 2.4 it holds
that `s is continuous, so
q¯0 = `
s(p0, pJ − q¯J).
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It now follows from the definition that q¯ ∈ As(p). 2
The liquidity policy (Acerbi and Scandolo, 2008) incorporates the requirements imposed
by a regulator or the contractual obligations that have to be met, and specifies that the
portfolio of the firm should belong to the set Ls ⊂ P in state of nature s ∈ S. We denote
L = (Ls)s∈S. The state dependence of the liquidity policy enables us to model regulatory
risk as well as short sale constraints which depend on market conditions as expressed in
the prevailing MDC.
The literature on risk allocation games has so far ignored liquidity policies.
Definition 2.6. The liquidity policy is trivial if for every s ∈ S it holds that Ls = P.
Throughout the paper we make the following assumption on L.
Assumption 2.7. For every s ∈ S, it holds that
(i) Ls is closed and convex;
(ii) for every p ∈ Ls, for every a > 0, p⊕ a ∈ Ls;
(iii) As(θ(N)) ∩ Ls 6= ∅.
The first two items in Assumption 2.7 are inherited from Acerbi and Scandolo (2008).
Closedness as required in Assumption 2.7.(i) is a standard technical assumption. Convexity
means that if two portfolios are acceptable, then so is their weighted average. Assump-
tion 2.7.(ii) implies that it is always acceptable to have more cash. Assumption 2.7.(iii)
guarantees that in every state there is a feasible choice to meet the requirements of the
liquidity policy. Assumption 2.7 is clearly satisfied if the liquidity policy is trivial.
In case all assets are perfectly liquid, the liquidity policy is irrelevant. This is the case
which has been studied in the existing literature on risk allocation games. Even if the
liquidity policy is trivial, the liquidity of assets can matter if there is a bid-ask spread.
For a portfolio p ∈ P, we denote the assets hold long by J+(p) = {j ∈ J | pj > 0} and
the assets hold short by J−(p) = {j ∈ J | pj < 0}.
Definition 2.8. The uppermost mark-to-market value of a portfolio p ∈ P in state s ∈ S
is defined by
us(p) = p0 +
∑
j∈J+(p)
msj(0
+)pj +
∑
j∈J−(p)
msj(0
−)pj. (2)
The uppermost mark-to-market value of a portfolio can be interpreted as the value
of a portfolio in the long run. Long positions are valued using the best bid prices and
short positions using the best ask prices. In case all asset markets are perfectly liquid, the
uppermost mark-to-market value of a portfolio is equal to its liquidation mark-to-market
value. Acerbi and Scandolo (2008) prove the following result.
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Proposition 2.9. For every s ∈ S, the function us : P 7→ R is continuous, concave, and
positive homogeneous of degree one.
Two portfolios p, q ∈ P are said to be concordant if pjqj ≥ 0 for all j ∈ J. Two portfolios
are concordant if there is no asset which is held long in one portfolio and short in the other.
It is easily verified that us is additive for concordant portfolios. The concavity and positive
homogeneity of us imply that us is superadditive on P, i.e. us(p) + us(q) ≤ us(p + q) for
all p, q ∈ P.
Corollary 2.10. For every s ∈ S, the function us is superadditive on P and additive for
concordant portfolios.
Given some state s ∈ S, the firm might have to liquidate part of its assets to obtain
a portfolio in Ls. The initial portfolio’s value in state s is given by the highest attainable
uppermost mark-to-market value satisfying the liquidity policy. These considerations lead
us to the following definition.
Definition 2.11. The realization vector X(N) ∈ RS for the firm is equal to
Xs(N) = sup{us(q)|q ∈ As(θ(N)) ∩ Ls}, s ∈ S. (3)
Since As(θ(N))∩Ls 6= ∅ by Assumption 2.7, it follows that Xs(N) is not equal to −∞.
We will show in Proposition 3.5 that Xs(N) is bounded from above by us(θ(N)), so Xs(N)
is finite.
The following example shows why in Equation (3) we need a supremum rather than a
maximum.
Example 2.12. Consider the case where θ(N) = (θ0(N), θJ(N)) ∈ R3, so we have two
assets, called 1 and 2, and cash. There is no uncertainty, so the cardinality of S is one.
The liquidity policy L specifies that the asset portfolio qJ should satisfy qJ ≥ (−1,−1)
and (q1 + 1)(q2 + 1) ≥ 1. Moreover, for simplicity assume there are no constraints on cash
holdings. We assume the initial asset portfolio to be θ(N) = (0,−1,−1) and we assume
asset 2 to be perfectly liquid.
Trading in asset 1 involves liquidity costs. For instance, consider the case where there is
a simple bid-ask spread, so for some γ > 0, m1(x) = 1 + γ if x < 0 and m1(x) = 1 if x > 0.
Since we have to go to a portfolio of assets where holdings of both assets strictly exceed −1,
we would like to buy ε > 0 of asset 1, buy 1/ε of asset 2, and go short in cash, resulting in
a portfolio q(ε) = (−(1 + γ)ε−m2(0−)/ε,−1 + ε,−1 + 1/ε). It is straightforward to verify
that u(q(ε)) = u(θ(N))− γε. The uppermost mark-to-market value would be maximized,
and liquidity costs would be minimized, by taking the smallest positive ε, something which
clearly does not exist, so we need a supremum rather than a maximum in Equation (3).
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We will show in Proposition 3.6 that optimal portfolios exist under the mild and rea-
sonable additional assumption that going infinitely short or long involves liquidity costs.
Under such an additional assumption, one can use a maximum in Equation (3).
Artzner, Delbaen, Eber, and Heath (1999) have introduced coherent measures of risk.
A measure of risk is a function ρ : RS → R measuring the risk of a realization vector
from the perspective of the present. It corresponds to the minimal amount of cash the
regulated agent has to add to his portfolio, and to invest in a reference instrument today,
such that the risk involved in the portfolio is acceptable to the regulator. We assume that
the reference instrument has payoff 1 in each state of nature at t = 1, thus its realization
vector is 1S = (1, . . . , 1). It is most natural to think of it as a zero coupon bond. The price
of the reference instrument can be thought of as the discount factor and is denoted by δ.
Definition 2.13. A function ρ : RS → R is a coherent measure of risk if it satisfies the
following axioms.
1. Monotonicity : for all X, Y ∈ RS such that Y ≥ X, we have ρ(Y ) ≤ ρ(X).
2. Subadditivity : for all X, Y ∈ RS, we have ρ(X + Y ) ≤ ρ(X) + ρ(Y ).
3. Positive homogeneity : for all X ∈ RS and h ∈ R+, we have ρ(hX) = hρ(X).
4. Translation invariance: for all X ∈ RS and a ∈ R, we have ρ(X + a1S) = ρ(X)− δa.
This completes the definition of a risk environment with liquidity considerations
(N, J, S, pi, θ,m, L, ρ).
3 Risk Allocation Games with Liquidity Constraints
A cooperative game with transferable utility consists of a set of players N and a value
function v : 2N → R, which assigns to every coalition C ∈ 2N of players a worth v(C) ∈ R.
By assumption it holds that v(∅) = 0. An allocation is a vector y ∈ Rn, where yi is the
payoff of player i ∈ N . An allocation y yields payoff y(C) = ∑i∈C yi to the members of
coalition C. An allocation y ∈ Rn is called efficient if y(N) = v(N), individually rational
if yi ≥ v({i}) for all i ∈ N, and coalitionally rational if y(C) ≥ v(C) for all C ∈ 2N . The
core is the set of efficient and coalitionally rational allocations.
Denault (2001) introduces risk capital allocation problems in order to study how the
risk of the firm as measured by a coherent measure of risk has to be attributed to its
divisions. The risk allocated to a coalition of divisions C ∈ 2N should be stable, meaning
that it does not exceed the risk of the aggregate portfolio of coalition C.
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Denault (2001) abstracts both from MDCs and liquidity policies, and thereby implicitly
assumes that all assets are perfectly liquid and the liquidity policy is trivial. Under perfect
liquidity of all assets and a trivial liquidity policy, we can define the realization vector
of division i ∈ N by Xs({i}) = us(θi), s ∈ S. A coalition of divisions C ∈ 2N has
the realization vector X(C) =
∑
i∈C X({i}). Finally, the worth of coalition C is defined
by v(C) = −ρ(X(C)). In this way we have obtained a cooperative game with transferable
utility (N, v). Standard solution concepts from cooperative game theory can now be applied
to (N, v) to solve the risk allocation problem. A stable risk allocation corresponds to a
core allocation.
When we incorporate liquidity constraints, we face an externality problem, as any
division of the firm can liquidate some of its assets in order to satisfy the liquidity policy,
and the more assets one division liquidates, the less assets have to be liquidated by other
divisions. The standard approaches to define a game in characteristic function form in the
presence of externalities are α–effectiveness and β–effectiveness as suggested by Aumann
(1961), thereby generalizing the two–player case treated by von Neumann and Morgenstern
(1944) to the case with an arbitrary number of players. The notion of α–effectiveness defines
the payoff of a coalition as the payoff it can achieve irrespective of the actions taken by its
complement. The next example illustrates why α–effectiveness is not useful to study risk
allocation in the presence of liquidity constraints.
Example 3.1. Consider the case where we have one asset, J = {1}, and no uncertainty.
The liquidity policy L specifies that the firm’s portfolio q should satisfy q1 ≥ −1. The firm
has two divisions, N = {1, 2}, with identical initial portfolios given by θ1 = (1,−1) and
θ2 = (1,−1). Consider the case where there is a simple bid-ask spread, so for some γ > 0,
we have m1(x) = 1 + γ if x < 0 and m1(x) = 1 if x > 0. Under α–effectiveness, division 1’s
realization is equal to
X({1}) = sup{u ∈ R | ∃q1 ∈ A(θ1),∀q2 ∈ A(θ2), q1 + q2 ∈ L and u(q1) ≥ u}.
For i = 1, 2, we have that qi ∈ A(θi) if and only if
[qi1 ≥ −1 and qi0 = 1− (qi1 + 1)(1 + γ)] or [qi1 ≤ −1 and qi0 = −qi1].
Since for any choice of q1 ∈ A(θ1) there is q2 ∈ A(θ2) such that q1 + q2 6∈ L, in fact any
q2 such that q21 < −q11 − 1 would do, we find that X({1}) = −∞. Notice that the same
conclusion would follow even in the absence of a bid-ask spread.
The notion of β–effectiveness is less stringent and defines the payoff of a coalition
as what it can achieve for sure given the worst actions of its complement, so now the
complementary coalition acts first. We continue Example 3.1 by demonstrating that also
β–effectiveness leads to undesirable consequences.
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Example 3.2. Consider the primitives of Example 3.1. Under β–effectiveness, division 1’s
realization is equal to
X({1}) = sup{u ∈ R | ∀q2 ∈ A(θ2),∃q1 ∈ A(θ1), q1 + q2 ∈ L and u(q1) ≥ u}.
Consider some q2 ∈ A(θ2) with q21 ≤ −1. To satisfy q1 + q2 ∈ L, it should hold that
q11 ≥ −q21 − 1 and therefore that q11 ≥ 0. It can easily be computed that
u(q1) = −γ − γq11 ≤ −γ + γ(q21 + 1) = γq21.
Since q21 can be chosen arbitrarily negative, we find that X({1}) = −∞.
Both α-effectiveness and β-effectiveness lead to undesirable properties of the value
function, even in the simplest of examples. Both approaches share the feature that the
complement of a coalition C is supposed to take the worst possible action. Rather than
making such an extreme assumption, we will instead assume that the complement of coali-
tion C remains inactive, so the burden of satisfying the liquidity policy will be put entirely
on coalition C. The portfolios which are attainable for coalition C in state s ∈ S are given
by As(θ(C)), where θ(C) =
∑
i∈C θ
i. Inactivity of the complementary coalition means that
those divisions stick to their initial portfolio, which equals θ(N \ C) in the aggregate.
Definition 3.3. Given a risk environment with liquidity considerations (N, J, S, pi, θ,m, L, ρ)
and a coalition of divisions C ∈ 2N , the realization vector X(C) of coalition C is defined
by
Xs(C) = sup{us(q)|q ∈ As(θ(C)) and q + θ(N \ C) ∈ Ls}, s ∈ S.
When calculating Xs(C), we take the portfolios of the divisions outside the coalition
as fixed, and liquidate the portfolios of the divisions in C in such a way that the resulting
portfolio of the firm is attainable and satisfies the liquidity policy. Applying Definition 3.3
for the grand coalition N results in
Xs(N) = sup{us(q) | q ∈ As(θ(N)) ∩ Ls},
which is in accordance with Equation (3).
The next result is useful in simplifying our expression for the realization vector of a
coalition.
Proposition 3.4. For every s ∈ S, for every C ∈ 2N , it holds that q ∈ As(θ(C)) if and
only if q + θ(N \ C) ∈ As(θ(N)).
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Proof. The result follows from the observation that
q ∈ As(θ(C))
if and only if
q0 = `
s(θ0(C), θJ(C)− qJ) = θ0(C) + `s(0, θJ(C)− qJ)
if and only if
q0 + θ0(N \ C) = θ0(C) + `s(0, θJ(C)− qJ) + θ0(N \ C)
= `s(θ0(N), θJ(N)− qJ − θJ(N \ C))
if and only if
q + θ(N \ C) ∈ As(θ(N)).
2
Proposition 3.4 shows that we can compute the realization vector of coalition C as
Xs(C) = sup{us(q)|q + θ(N \ C) ∈ As(θ(N)) ∩ Ls}, s ∈ S. (4)
The next result provides bounds on the value of Xs(C), implying that this value is not
equal to −∞ or +∞.
Proposition 3.5. For every s ∈ S, for every q ∈ As(θ(N)) ∩ Ls, it holds that
us(q − θ(N \ C)) ≤ Xs(C) ≤ us(θ(C)), C ∈ 2N .
Proof. Consider some q ∈ As(θ(N)) ∩ Ls, where the latter set is non-empty by Assump-
tion 2.7. Using (4), it follows that us(q − θ(N \ C)) ≤ Xs(C).
Next, consider some q ∈ As(θ(C)). It holds that
q0 = `
s(θ0(C), θJ(C)− qJ) = θ0(C) +
∑
j∈J
∫ θj(C)−qj
0
msj(x)dx.
It follows that
us(q) = θ0(C) +
∑
j∈J
∫ θj(C)−qj
0
msj(x)dx+
∑
j∈J+(q)m
s
j(0
+)qj +
∑
j∈J−(q)m
s
j(0
−)qj
= θ0(C) +
∑
j∈J+(q)(
∫ θj(C)−qj
0
msj(x)dx+m
s
j(0
+)qj)
+
∑
j∈J−(q)(
∫ θj(C)−qj
0
msj(x)dx+m
s
j(0
−)qj).
Notice that irrespective of the sign of θj(C)− qj it holds that∫ θj(C)−qj
0
msj(x)dx ≤ msj(0−)(θj(C)− qj) and
∫ θj(C)−qj
0
msj(x)dx ≤ msj(0+)(θj(C)− qj).
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Consider some j ∈ J+(q). If θj(C) > 0, then∫ θj(C)−qj
0
msj(x)dx+m
s
j(0
+)qj ≤ msj(0+)(θj(C)− qj) +msj(0+)qj = msj(0+)(θj(C)).
If θj(C) < 0, then∫ θj(C)−qj
0
msj(x)dx+m
s
j(0
+)qj ≤ msj(0−)(θj(C)− qj) +msj(0−)qj = msj(0−)(θj(C)).
Consider some j ∈ J−(q). If θj(C) > 0, then∫ θj(C)−qj
0
msj(x)dx+m
s
j(0
−)qj ≤ msj(0+)(θj(C)− qj) +msj(0+)qj = msj(0+)(θj(C)).
If θj(C) < 0, then∫ θj(C)−qj
0
msj(x)dx+m
s
j(0
−)qj ≤ msj(0−)(θj(C)− qj) +msj(0−)qj = msj(0−)(θj(C)).
We therefore find that
us(q) ≤ θ0(C) +
∑
j∈J+(θ(C))
msj(0
+)θj(C) +
∑
j∈J−(θ(C))
msj(0
−)θj(C) = us(θ(C)),
which completes the proof. 2
If the liquidity policy is trivial, then it holds that θ(N) ∈ As(θ(N)) ∩ Ls, so Propo-
sition 3.5 gives Xs(C) = us(θ(C)). If, moreover, there are no bid-ask spreads, it holds
that Xs(C) =
∑
i∈C X
s({i}), the case which has been studied in the literature so far. In
case the liquidity policy is trivial, but assets are not perfectly liquid and there is a bid-ask
spread, it is still the case that the realization of division i ∈ N in state s is given by
Xs({i}) = us(θi), but it is no longer necessarily the case that the realization vector of a
coalition of divisions C ∈ 2N is given by X(C) = ∑i∈C X({i}) as now coalitions can save
on costs related to bid-ask spreads by combining their portfolios.
We show next that the supremum in Equation (4) can be replaced by a maximum under
the mild condition that going infinitely short or long in an asset involves liquidity costs.
Proposition 3.6. Assume that for every s ∈ S, for every j ∈ J, there is x− such that
msj(x
−) > msj(0
+) and there is x+ such that msj(x
+) < msj(0
−). Then for every C ∈ 2N it
holds that
Xs(C) = max{us(q)|q + θ(N \ C) ∈ As(θ(N)) ∩ Ls}, s ∈ S.
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Proof. Consider some s ∈ S and let (qr)r∈N be a sequence such that (qr)r∈N+θ(N\C) ∈
As(θ(N)) ∩ Ls and us(qr) converges to Xs(C).
Suppose there is an asset j′ ∈ J such that for some appropriately chosen subsequence,
limr→∞(qrj′)r∈N = −∞. We will derive a contradiction. By repeating the steps in the proof
of Proposition 3.5, we derive that
us(qr) ≤ θ0(C) +
∑
j∈J+(θ(C))m
s
j(0
+)θj(C) +
∑
j∈J−(θ(C))\{j′}m
s
j(0
−)θj(C)
+
∫ θj′ (C)−qrj′
0 m
s
j′(x)dx+m
s
j′(0
−)qrj′
≤ θ0(C) +
∑
j∈J+(θ(C))m
s
j(0
+)θj(C) +
∑
j∈J−(θ(C))\{j′}m
s
j(0
−)θj(C)
+msj′(x
+)θj′(C) + (m
s
j′(0
−)−msj′(x+))qrj′ ,
where the right-hand side tends to −∞ if r →∞ since msj′(0−) > msj′(x+). This contradicts
the conclusion of Proposition 3.5, which establishes that Xs(C) is bounded from below.
We have shown that for every j ∈ J there is no subsequence of (qr)r∈N such that
limr→∞(qrj )r∈N = −∞. By the straightforward analogous argument, we can show that for
every j ∈ J there is no subsequence of (qr)r∈N such that limr→∞(qrj )r∈N =∞. It follows that
the sequence (qrJ)r∈N is bounded. By continuity of `
s on P as asserted in Proposition 2.4,
it follows that the sequence (qr0)r∈N is bounded. Without loss of generality, the sequence
(qr)r∈N can be assumed to converge to some q¯ ∈ P. The set As(θ(N)) ∩ Ls is closed as the
intersection of two sets which are closed by Proposition 2.5 and Assumption 2.7. It follows
that q¯ + θ(N \ C) ∈ As(θ(N)) ∩ Ls. By Proposition 2.9 it holds that us is continuous, so
Xs(C) = us(q¯). 2
Since the existing literature on risk allocation assumes perfect liquidity, and we would
like to incorporate perfect liquidity as a special case, we refrain from assumptions addi-
tional to Assumption 2.7, and continue with the formulation of Equation (4) involving a
supremum.
Definition 3.7. Given a risk environment with liquidity considerations (N, J, S, pi, θ,m, L, ρ),
the risk allocation game with liquidity constraints is the game (N, v), where the value func-
tion v : 2N → R is defined by
v(C) = −ρ(X(C)), C ∈ 2N . (5)
Let Γrl denote the family of risk allocation games with liquidity constraints with set of
players N. In such a game, according to Equation (5), the larger the risk of any subset of
portfolios, the lower its worth.
Example 3.8. Consider a firm with n = 2 divisions, where each division has invested into
one asset and cash, J = {1}. The portfolios of the divisions are θ1 = (20,−6) and θ2 =
13
(26,−7), so both divisions have short positions in the risky asset. We assume S = {1, 2}
with both states having equal probability of occurrence.
In state 1 the MDC of the risky asset is given by
m11(x) =
5 if x < 0,4 if x > 0.
In state 2 the MDC of the risky asset is given by
m21(x) =

10 if x < −2,
9 if −2 ≤ x < −1,
8 if −1 ≤ x < 0,
7 if 0 < x ≤ 1,
6 if 1 < x.
We consider the deterministic liquidity policy specified by
L1 = L2 = {p ∈ P | p1 ≥ −10}.
In both states the liquidity policy of the firm does not allow to short the risky asset by more
than 10 units. According to the initial portfolios, the two divisions together are 6+7=13
units short in the risky asset. We set δ = 1 and take the maximum loss as the coherent
measure of risk, so ρ(X) = maxs∈S −Xs.
First, let us consider state 1. This element of the realization vector of division 1 is
calculated as follows. Looking at the MDC of the risky asset in state 1, we see that the
firm can buy the risky asset for a price of 5, and it can sell more risky assets for a price of 4.
Since currently the two divisions together are shorting 13 units from the risky asset and the
liquidity policy allows to short at most 10 units, at least 3 units should be bought. If 3 units
are bought for a price of 5×3 = 15, division 1 ends up with the portfolio q1({1}) = (5,−3)
in state 1 by trading t1({1}) = (−15, 3). The uppermost mark-to-market value of q1({1})
is u1(q1({1})) = 5− 3× 5 = −10. It is easy to check that we get the same value if division
1 buys anywhere between 3 to 6 units from the risky asset. Due to the bid-ask spread,
buying back more than 6 units would result in a loss of 1 for each additional unit, since long
positions would be valued at 4 per unit. It follows that the realization vector of division
1 in state 1 is X1({1}) = −10. Similarly, the realization vector of division 2 in state 1 is
X1({2}) = −9. For the firm itself, we have θ1 + θ2 = (46,−13), and an optimal portfolio
q1({1, 2}) satisfying the liquidity constraint is any convex combination of the portfolios
(31,−10) and (−19, 0), resulting in X1({1, 2}) = −19.
Next, let us analyze state 2. Again, division 1 should buy at least 3 units of the risky
asset to satisfy the liquidity policy. Buying 3 units and trading t2({1}) = (−27, 3) will
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result in q2({1}) = (−7,−3) and u2(q2({1})) = −7 − 3 × 8 = −31. Buying more than 3
units would be costly. For instance, buying 4 units by trading t¯2({1}) = (−37, 4) would
result in q¯2({1}) = (−17,−2) and u2(q¯2({1})) = −17− 2× 8 = −33, hence division 1 will
only buy 3 units. The remaining short position will be valued at the best ask price, and
X2({2}) = −31. Similarly, the realization vector of division 2 in state 2 is X2({2}) = −33.
For the firm itself, since θ1 + θ2 = (46,−13), the optimal trade is t2({1, 2}) = (−27, 3),
leading to q2({1, 2}) = (19,−10) and X2({1, 2}) = u2(q2({1, 2})) = 19 − 10 × 8 = −61.
The calculations and the resulting cooperative game are summarized in Table 1.
state/X(C) X({1}) X({2}) X({1, 2})
s = 1 −10 −9 −19
s = 2 −31 −33 −61
ρ(X(C)) 31 33 61
v(C) −31 −33 −61
Table 1: A risk allocation game with liquidity constraints.
Note that in state 1 the realization vector of coalition {1, 2} is additive over its members’
realization vectors, which is due to the flat MDCs and the concordant portfolios. In state
2 coalition {1, 2} gains since it only has to buy back once 3 units of the risky asset at
a higher price. Also note that if the original portfolio of the grand coalition satisfies the
liquidity policy and the portfolios of the divisions are concordant, then we get additivity
for the realization vector. On the other hand, if for the same asset with a positive bid-ask
spread some divisions have had long positions and some other divisions have had short
positions, then we would get superadditivity.
For two-player games, most single-valued solution concepts, and in particular the Shap-
ley value and the nucleolus, would share the surplus of the grand coalition over the indi-
vidual worths equally over the players. In this example, this would result in the allocation
(−29.5,−31.5). The firms should add 61 units of cash to its portfolio to make it acceptable
to the regulator, and the risk allocation over the divisions corresponds to 29.5 units of cash
for division 1 and 31.5 units of cash for division 2.
Rather than assuming the worst-case for the behavior of the opponents, we have utilized
the fact that in a risk environment with liquidity considerations, divisions have initial
portfolios, which means that it is meaningful to speak about inaction of a division. We have
calculated the realization vector of a coalition by assuming inactivity of the complementary
coalition.
Another alternative which comes to mind when defining the realization vector of a
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coalition, is to assume that the complementary coalition is going to hold the 0 portfolio.
Alternatively, one could think of this assumption as ignoring the complementary coalition.
It is not hard to see that this is not an attractive alternative. Consider for instance the
risk environment with liquidity considerations of Example 3.8. When the complementary
coalition holds the 0 portfolio, it is easy to calculate that v({1}) = −28, v({2}) = −30,
and v({1, 2}) = −61. The resulting risk allocation game with liquidity constraints is not
superadditive. The reason is that in this example, it is easier for a single division to satisfy
the short-sales constraint of 10 units than it is for the entire firm. Failure of superadditivity
is not natural for the problem under consideration, as the entire firm has more actions at
its disposal to satisfy the liquidity policy than a single division.
The next example demonstrates how important it is to take liquidity considerations
into account in risk allocation.
Example 3.9. Consider a firm with n = 2 divisions, where we have cash and two risky
assets, J = {1, 2}. The portfolios of the divisions are θ1 = (−16, 5, 0) and θ2 = (−14, 0, 5),
so the divisions have long positions in different assets. We assume S = {1, 2} with both
states having equal probability of occurrence.
In state 1 the MDCs of the risky assets are given by
m11(x) =
{
4.4 if x < 0,
3.4 if x > 0,
m12(x) =
{
3.6 if x < 0,
2.6 if x > 0.
Except for the bid-ask spread, both assets are liquid. In state 2 the MDCs of the risky
assets coincide and they are less liquid,
m21(x) = m
2
2(x) =

4 if x < 0,
3 if 0 < x ≤ 1,
2 if 1 < x.
We consider the deterministic liquidity policy specified by
L1 = L2 = {p ∈ P | p0 ≥ −23}.
Since θ1+θ2 = (−30, 5, 5), to fulfill the liquidity policy of the firm, 7 units of cash should be
generated in both states. As before, we compute the realization vector for every coalition.
We set δ = 1 and take the maximum loss as the coherent measure of risk, so ρ(X) =
maxs∈S −Xs. The realization vectors and the resulting cooperative game are displayed in
Table 2.
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state/X(C) X({1}) X({2}) X({1, 2})
s = 1 1 −1 0
s = 2 −3 −1 −2
ρ(X(C)) 3 1 2
v(C) −3 −1 −2
Table 2: The risk allocation game when taking liquidity into account.
Again, for two-player games, most single-valued solution concepts, and in particular
the Shapley value and the nucleolus, would share the surplus of the grand coalition over
the individual worths equally over the players. In this example, this would result in the
allocation (−2, 0). The firm should add 2 units of cash to its portfolio to make it acceptable
to the regulator, and the risk allocation over the divisions corresponds to 2 units of cash
for division 1 and 0 units of cash for division 2. The risk equal to 2 units is fully allocated
to division 1.
The analysis without liquidity considerations would pretend that all assets are perfectly
liquid. The MDCs of the risky assets are now given by
m11(x) = 3.4, x ∈ R \ {0},
m12(x) = 2.6, x ∈ R \ {0},
m11(x) = 3, x ∈ R \ {0},
m11(x) = 3, x ∈ R \ {0}.
The realization vectors and the resulting cooperative game are displayed in Table 3.
state/X(C) X({1}) X({2}) X({1, 2})
s = 1 1 −1 0
s = 2 −1 1 0
ρ(X(C)) 1 1 0
v(C) −1 −1 0
Table 3: A risk allocation game without taking liquidity into account.
In this case the allocation would be strikingly different, (0, 0). The firm does not have
to add any cash to its portfolio to make it acceptable to the regulator. Both divisions are
now treated symmetrically.
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4 Total Balancedness
This section is devoted to the question whether it is always possible to allocate risk in a
stable way, which is equivalent to the question whether the core of the risk allocation game
with liquidity constraints is non-empty.
For each C ∈ 2N , let a(C) ∈ Rn be the membership vector, ai(C) = 1 for i ∈ C and
ai(C) = 0 otherwise.
Definition 4.1. A balanced vector of weights is a vector (λC)C∈2N ∈ R2N+ such that∑
C∈2N λ
Ca(C) = a(N). A game (N, v) is balanced if
∑
C∈2N λ
Cv(C) ≤ v(N) for all bal-
anced vectors of weights.
A well-known interpretation of balancedness is that the players can distribute one unit
of working time to any coalition and if each coalition is active during a fraction λC of a unit
of time, then the players cannot generate more value than v(N), the value of the grand
coalition. Balancedness is a necessary and sufficient condition for non-emptiness of the
core in a transferable utility game (Bondareva, 1963; Shapley, 1967). See Predtetchinski
and Herings (2004) for an extension of the concept of balancedness to be necessary and
sufficient for non-emptiness of the core in non-transferable utility games.
For a game (N, v) and a coalition C ∈ 2N , a subgame (C, vC) is obtained by restricting
v to subsets of C.
Definition 4.2. A game (N, v) is totally balanced if for every D ∈ 2N its subgame (D, vD)
is balanced, that is, if for all D ∈ 2N and for all vectors (λC)C∈2D ∈ R2D+ satisfying∑
C∈2D λ
Ca(C) = a(D), we have
∑
C∈2D λ
Cv(C) ≤ v(D).
In a totally balanced game, every subgame has a non-empty core. Let Γtb denote the
family of totally balanced games with n players.
The next proposition claims that any risk allocation game with liquidity constraints is
totally balanced. It follows that risk allocation games with liquidity constraints, as well as
subgames of risk allocation games with liquidity constraints, have a non-empty core and
that risk can always be allocated in a stable way.
Proposition 4.3. All games (N, v) ∈ Γrl are totally balanced, Γrl ⊂ Γtb.
Proof. Consider a risk environment with liquidity considerations (N, J, S, pi, θ,m, L, ρ)
inducing the risk allocation game (N, v). We show that for any non-empty D ∈ 2N , the
subgame (D, vD) is balanced. We define D = 2D \ {∅}. Take any (λC)C∈D ∈ RD+ such that∑
C∈D λ
Ca(C) = a(D).
Take ε > 0. For s ∈ S and C ∈ D, let qs(C) ∈ P be such that qs(C) + θ(N \ C) ∈
As(θ(N)) ∩ Ls and
us(qs(C)) ≥ Xs(C)− ε. (6)
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The vector of actual trades is given by
ts(C) = qs(C)− θ(C). (7)
First, we present eight lines containing equalities and inequalities proving the proposi-
tion, then we explain why each step is true.
It holds that∑
C∈D
λCvD(C) = −
∑
C∈D
λCρ(X(C)) (8)
= −
∑
C∈D
ρ(λCX(C)) (9)
≤ −ρ(
∑
C∈D
(λCX(C))) (10)
≤ −ρ(
∑
C∈D
(λC((us(qs(C)) + ε)s∈S))) (11)
≤ −ρ((us(
∑
C∈D
λCqs(C))s∈S) +
∑
C∈D
λCε1S) (12)
= −ρ((us(
∑
C∈D
λCqs(C))s∈S)) + δε
∑
C∈D
λC (13)
≤ −ρ(X(D) + δε
∑
C∈D
λC (14)
= vD(D) + δε
∑
C∈D
λC . (15)
Since
∑
C∈D λ
C ≤ n, we have that δε∑C∈D λC tends to zero as ε tends to zero. Therefore,
when taking the limit as ε ↓ 0, the chain of equalities and inequalities (8)–(15) imply that∑
C∈D
λCvD(C) ≤ vD(D),
so the game (D, vD) is balanced.
Equation (8) follows from Equation (5) and Equation (9) follows from the positive ho-
mogeneity of ρ. Inequality (10) is due to the subadditivity of ρ. Equation (11) plugs in
Equation (6). Inequality (12) is true because of the positive homogeneity and superad-
ditivity of u (following from Proposition 2.9), and the monotonicity of ρ. Equation (13)
makes use of the fact that ρ satisfies translation invariance. Due to the monotonicity of ρ,
Inequality (14) is true if we can prove that for each s ∈ S it holds that
us(
∑
C∈D
λCqs(C)) ≤ Xs(D). (16)
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Consider any s ∈ S. Take any i ∈ D, define Ci = {C ∈ 2D | i ∈ C} and Di = D \ Ci.
We have that∑
C∈D λ
Cus(qs(C)) =
∑
C∈Ci λ
Sus(qs(C)) +
∑
C∈Di λ
Cus(qs(C))
≤ ∑C∈Ci λCus(qs(C)) +∑C∈Di λCus(θ(C))
≤ us(∑C∈Ci λCqs(C) +∑C∈Di λCθ(C))
= us(
∑
C∈Ci λ
C(ts(C) + θ(C)) +
∑
C∈Di λ
Cθ(C))
= us(θ(D) +
∑
C∈Ci λ
Cts(C))
= us(
∑
C∈Ci λ
C(θ(D) + ts(C))),
where the first inequality follows from Proposition 3.5 and the second inequality from
Corollary 2.10.
We define ps(D) =
∑
C∈Ci λ
C(θ(D) + ts(C)) and show that ps(D) + θ(N \D) ∈ Ls. For
every C ∈ Ci it holds that qs(C) + θ(N \ C) ∈ Ls. Therefore, it holds that
θ(D) + ts(C) + θ(N \D) = qs(C) + θ(D \ C) + θ(N \D) = qs(C) + θ(N \ C) ∈ Ls.
Since
∑
C∈Ci λ
C = 1 and Ls is convex, we have that ps(D) + θ(N \D) ∈ Ls.
Finally, we define qs(D) ∈ P by qsJ(D) = psJ(D) and
qs0(D) = `
s(θ0(D),
∑
C∈Ci
λCtsJ(C)).
Since `s is concave, we have
qs0(D) ≥
∑
C∈Ci
λC`s(θ0(D), t
s
J(C)) = θ0(D)−
∑
C∈Ci
λCts0(C) = p
s
0(D),
so us(qs(D)) ≥ us(ps(D)). By definition, it holds that qs(D) ∈ As(θ(D)).Assumption 2.7.(ii)
implies that qs(D) + θ(N \D) ∈ Ls. It follows that∑
C∈D
λCus(qs(C)) ≤ us(ps(D)) ≤ us(qs(D)) ≤ Xs(D).
2
Note that all the axioms of coherent measures of risk were used in the proof of Propo-
sition 4.3.
Not only is it true that all risk allocation games with liquidity constraints are totally
balanced. It also holds that any totally balanced game can be generated by a risk allocation
game with liquidity constraints. It suffices to take one perfectly liquid asset with a trivial
liquidity policy and apply the construction of Cso´ka, Herings, and Ko´czy (2009)[Proposition
3.2]. Thus we have the following theorem.
Theorem 4.4. The class of risk allocation games with liquidity constraints coincides with
the class of totally balanced games, Γrl = Γtb.
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5 Conclusion
Liquidity is of crucial importance when assessing the risk involved in an asset portfolio.
Nevertheless, the literature on risk allocation games has so far ignored this important
aspect. When we add a liquidity policy to a risk environment, we obtain an environment
that is characterized by pervasive externalities. Indeed, when attributing the risk of a firm
to its divisions, the question whether a single division satisfies the liquidity policy cannot be
answered without making assumptions about the behavior of the complementary divisions.
We argue that the standard ways to deal with externalities, α-effectiveness and β-
effectiveness are not appropriate here, and that it is also not possible to simply ignore
the complementary divisions. Since in our framework the property rights of divisions are
well-defined, it is meaningful to speak about inactivity of a coalition. We then say that
a coalition of divisions satisfies the liquidity policy if it does so when the complementary
coalition is inactive.
Our main result demonstrates that this approach leads to risk allocation games that
are totally balanced. It is therefore possible to attribute the risk of a firm to its divisions
in a stable way, since the core of a totally balanced game is evidently non-empty. In fact,
the core of any subgame of a totally balanced game is non-empty as well, so the risk of
any division can also be attributed in a stable way to its subdivisions too.
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